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Abstract 
This paper investigates fossil fuel reserves and resources disclosures and how they might 
change in response to global climate change agreements that seek to limit greenhouse gas 
emissions.  On the one hand, it might be expected that fossil fuel firms will be less valuable if 
their reserves become ‘unburnable’. On the otherhand, capital markets currently assign a 
positive value to fossil fuel reserves and resources. A conundrum, therefore, exists. Given that 
accounting disclosure rules underpin capital market valuation processes, this setting provides 
an opportunity to interrogate the functionality of accounting during a time of change. To 
achieve this goal, a multi-methods investigation has been undertaken; combining a survey of 
accounting disclosure rules for reserves, identification of accounting disclosures made by fuel 
firms in several country stock markets, and stock market participants’ views on the extent to 
which unburnable carbon exists. Using Miller & Power (2013) we identify when and how 
unburnable carbon could be recognized in corporate reporting. 
 
Keywords: Accounting regulation; global climate change; unburnable carbon; stranded assets 
 
1. Introduction and context setting 
 
This paper draws on a body of work that examines the constitutive effects of accounting 
(Arrington & Francis, 1993; Burchell, Clubb & Hopwood, 1985; Hopwood & Miller, 1994; 
Robson, 1992); how accounting practices change over time (Chapman, Cooper & Miller, 2009; 
Neimark, 1992; Robson, 1991); and the processes by which change arises (Willmott, Puxty, 
Robson, Cooper & Lowe, 1992; Canning & O’Dwyer, 2013). Synthesizing this extensive line of 
inquiry, Miller & Power (2013, p. 557) suggest that a constructivist reading of accounting1 
highlights the “mutually constitutive nature of accounting, organizing and economizing” and 
describe accounting as having four functions, namely: (1) (re)creating calculative spaces for 
organizational and societal actors (territorializing); (2) making it possible for these actors to 
interact with each other (mediating); (3) providing information that would allow activities to 
be evaluated (adjudicating); and (4) thereby creating contexts in which control can be 
achieved (subjectivizing). They suggest that the “entanglement of these four roles … gives the 
                                                 
1 We have taken this characterization of accounting to include disclosures in documents such as the annual 
report and accounts. 
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“accounting complex” its productive forces, such that it is perhaps the most powerful system 
of representation for social and economic life today” (Miller & Power, 2013: 558). 
The empirical focus for this paper is the extent to which accounting and reporting 
representations reflect global climate change concerns. Specifically, an apparent 
contradiction is emerging between representations of the value of fossil fuel reserves: in 
Miller & Power’s (2013) terms, two sources of territorializing practices. On the one hand, data 
in annual reports and accounts quantify fossil fuel reserves and resources, and financial 
markets ascribe value to reserves and resources because they imply a future revenue stream. 
In contrast, global climate change science (alongside regulatory regimes in this area) suggests 
that not all fossil fuel reserves and resources currently identified will be combusted because 
to do so would lead to greenhouse gas emissions targets not being met (hence the phrase 
‘unburnable carbon’). Further, it is argued that the financial value of reserves and resources 
would be materially affected if the environmentally infused view of the value were to be the 
‘better’ descriptor of ‘reality’. The first aim of this paper, therefore, is to explain why these 
contrasting and mutually exclusive accounts of the value co-exist and to identify under what 
conditions we might expect to see changes in the value of fossil fuel firms.  To achieve this 
aim, we have undertaken interviews with market participants; a survey of required disclosure 
practices and a survey of corporate reporting to document and explain an absence of 
disclosure. At the same time, this setting creates the opportunity to support the second aim 
of the paper: to understand the functionality of accounting where there has yet to be a 
process that mediates between worldviews (using the language of Miller & Power). The Miller 
& Power (2013) framework has been developed to narrate broad developments in accounting 
scholarship: in this analysis we seek to understand its functionality in the context of a specific 
accounting problem. 
The suggestion that there may be unburnable carbon on the stock market was 
developed and championed by an NGO actor (the Carbon Tracker Initiative – see Carbon 
Tracker Initiative, 2011, and http://www.carbontracker.org/) and informed (and continues to 
inform) a fossil fuel divestment campaign (see http://gofossilfree.org/uk/; Richie & 
Dowlatabadi, 2015 and Ayling & Gunningham, 2017). Further, and using the language of 
capital markets risk, the Carbon Tracker Initiative proposes that a ‘carbon bubble’ may form 
on stock exchanges if valuation tensions are not resolved. The issue of unburnable carbon has 
caught the attention of the United Kingdom Financial Stability Board (Batten, Sowerbutts & 
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Tanaka, 2016) as well as the Governor of the Bank of England (Carney, 2015), albeit that these 
bodies do not currently believe that there is a carbon bubble forming on the UK Stock 
Exchange. 
Accounting disclosures are critical to the effective functioning of stock markets. In 
Miller & Power’s (2013) terms disclosure is essential to adjudication and information 
provision will allow evaluation of activities. We explicitly argue (in section 2 and elsewhere in 
the paper, informed by science and policy literature) that we should see disclosures about 
the issue of unburnable carbon. In so doing, the paper engages with the longstanding issue 
of when accounting “inscriptions … [are] recognisable to their users” (Robson, 1992, p. 695) 
and what happens when these representations are called into question.  Indeed, this is why 
the Carbon Tracker Initiative has focused attention on accounting rules (Association of 
Chartered Certified Accountants & Carbon Tracker Initiative, 2013; Carbon Tracker Initiative 
& the Grantham Research Institute, 2013) which they believed would provide a point of 
connection between global climate change concerns informed by science and policy, and 
inscriptions of economic value ascribed to fossil fuel companies by capital markets. This 
ambition meshes with Miller & Power’s (2013) concept of territorializing. What will become 
apparent from our data analysis, however, is that territorialization has not been achieved 
despite accounting valuation and disclosure rules being in place to support disclosure if 
carbon is judged to be unburnable. Why this might be the case and the implications that arise 
as a result are developed from this evidence base. 
The paper will proceed in the following manner. Section 2 explores the unburnable 
carbon proposition, drawing from policy and academic literature in order to set the scene for 
the paper. Given that scientific understanding may develop separately from capital market 
considerations, Section 3 presents findings from interviews with a number of capital market 
participants. Their views shed light on how and when the territorializing, mediating, 
adjudicating and subjectivizing role of accounting might be observed. Analysis then moves to 
focus specifically on adjudication by examining disclosures that have been made about 
unburnable carbon. In order to conduct this analysis, the recognition, measurement and 
reporting requirements for fossil fuel reserves and resources are reviewed in Section 4 
(including technical measurement standards, financial reporting requirements and stock 
exchange listing disclosure requirements and recommendations). As will become apparent 
from this review, fossil fuel reserve and resource disclosure is itself an ‘unsettled’ practice 
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which reflects longstanding political and economic contingencies (aligned with the economic 
consequences of accounting standard setting literature – see Cortese, Irvine & Kaidonis, 
2009). 
The paper then moves to present the disclosures of a sample of fossil fuel companies 
listed in seven countries, namely: Australia, Canada, China, Russia, South Africa, the United 
Kingdom and the United States of America. These countries have been selected for analysis 
as each of them have substantive listings of fossil fuel companies on their stock exchanges, 
and hence if we are to detect early stages of unburnable carbon disclosures it will likely be on 
these exchanges (likewise any bubble will affect these exchanges disproportionately). 
Disclosures are documented for sample companies across several reporting formats 
including: statutory disclosure formats (such as Annual Reports and Accounts; Forms 20F 
and/or Forms 10-K); in returns made to the Carbon Disclosure Project (a private investor lead 
global climate change information governance initiative, now known as CDP - 
https://www.cdp.net/en) and in standalone reports. Two time-periods were sampled for the 
main analysis (2011 and 2014) to provide snapshots of evolving disclosure patterns. 
Subsequent to this analysis, Section 5 of the paper seeks to explain the pattern of accounting 
related disclosure in the face of the unburnable carbon proposition. Finally, in Section 6 
concluding comments are made with respect to what this empirical study might suggest about 
the nature of accounting, returning to the characteristics outlined by Miller & Power (2013) 
and seeking to extend our observations beyond the specifics examined in the paper. 
 
2. Making the case for unburnable carbon  
 
There is widespread scientific consensus that anthropogenic global climate change is 
happening and, if left unchecked, will have a significant negative impact on human and non-
human populations (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2007, 2014; Department of 
Energy and Climate Change, 2011; Stern, 2006; United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change, 2015). A desire to avoid this outcome has resulted in the development of a 
variety of initiatives, including international agreements (of which the Paris Agreement is the 
most recent and wide ranging)2 and regional responses (such as the European Union 
                                                 
2 The political stability of the Paris Agreement is not guaranteed. Indeed, the USA has signaled its intention to 
withdraw from the Agreement (a view not shared by many of the States and cities within the country – see 
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Emissions Trading Scheme) through to national laws.3 All these initiatives (with different 
degrees of enforcement mechanisms) seek to mitigate global climate change by reducing 
emissions, primarily by focusing on reductions in fossil fuel combustion (that is, reducing oil, 
gas and coal use). A central concept in this area is that of a carbon budget. This is a physical 
measure of how much greenhouse gas can be emitted in a given time period, for a defined 
set of activities or for a particular territory/population, if emission targets are to be achieved. 
The most usual target in science and policy is the desire to keep global average temperature 
increase below 2 degrees Celsius, as it is believed that beyond this point there is a tipping 
point in the climate system that will be detrimental to human flourishing (in 2018 a IPCC 
special report recommended lowering this aim to 1.5 degrees of warming – see 
https://www.ipcc.ch/sr15/about/history/). A carbon budget also implies that there are 
carbon emissions that should not be generated; in the context of fossil fuel reserves in the 
ground, that there is carbon that is unburnable if climate change goals are to be met. Critically 
for this paper, Jakob & Hilaire (2015, p. 150) estimate that cumulative emissions must be less 
that “870 to 1,240 giga-tonnes between 2011 and 2050 … [and that] the carbon contained in 
global resources of fossil fuels is estimated to be equivalent to about 11,000 Gt of CO2, which 
means that the implementation of ambitious climate policies would lead to large proportions 
of reserves remaining unexploited”. 
 
Past economic development has relied upon fossil fuel energy, with that energy being 
available at relatively low prices. In the early 2000s, there were signs that the time of cheap 
fossil fuels were over (Kjärstad & Johnsson, 2009). However, coal remains an abundant 
resource and the recent rise of non-conventional oil and gas implies that an era of ‘peak’ oil 
is not imminent (McGlade & Ekins, 2015). For the next century or so it appears that the main 
factor limiting the use of fossil fuels will be the collective efforts of the international 
community to transition to a low carbon economy. Such a transition is likely to change the 
value of fossil fuels, albeit that this change is not currently apparent. For example, while 
                                                 
Bebbington & Harrison, 2017). Regardless of the position of any particular United States administration, the 
issues addressed in this paper remain pertinent. It is also the case that the government of the United States is not 
the only one to show myopia when it comes to climate change and future industry strategy: Lucas (2016) 
examines the risk of stranded assets in the Australian coal industry. 
3 See Nachmany, Fankhauser, Setzer & Averchenkova (2017) for the most current legislative update and 
http://www.lse.ac.uk/GranthamInstitute/research-theme/governance-and-legislation/ for a searchable database of 
legislation. 
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national and international policies are being developed and implemented to meet 2020 and 
2050 targets, nations are simultaneously encouraging the development of non-conventional 
fossil fuel resources, often subsidising these activities alongside conventional fossil fuels . In 
addition, there are considerable vested interests involved in terms of the timing of any low 
carbon transition, in which regions/countries reductions will first be seen, and which sectors 
will transition first (for example, energy production versus transportation). As a result, while 
global climate change governance regimes focus on limiting emissions, the detailed reduction 
trajectory (and whose carbon will be reduced first) is not fully determined. This makes it hard 
to know when, where and to what degree fossil fuel firms might face carbon constraints. 
What is clear, however, is that in the longer term some form of restriction will emerge. 
Two papers highlighted this restriction in Nature, leading to the first public realization that 
there may be an issue in this context (Allen, Frame, Huntingford, Jones, Meinshausen & 
Meinshausen, 2009; Meinshausen, Meinshausen, Hare, Raper, Frieler, Knutti, Frame & Allen, 
2009) with their propositions being reinforced, with increasing layers of granularity, over 
time. For example, the International Energy Agency, estimates that only two thirds of existing 
proven fossil fuels reserves (see section 3 – this terminology has specific meaning) can be 
burned if the objective of a 2oC increase in temperature by 2050 is to be achieved 
(International Energy Agency, 2012, p. 98). In a similar vein, McGlade & Ekins (2015, p. 187) 
examine limits by fossil fuel type and region and “suggest that, globally, a third of oil reserves, 
half of gas reserves and over 80 per cent of current coal reserves should remain unused from 
2010 to 2050 in order to meet the target of 2oC”. With this background in mind, the opening 
element addressed in this paper is how capital market participants understand the divergence 
between global climate change policy, the valuation of fossil fuel companies and the 
plausibility of unburnable carbon being found on stock markets. In Miller & Power’s (2013) 
terms, the interviews focus on the process of adjudication: that is, the provision of 
information for evaluation. Both territorialization and mediation are precursors to such a 
process. The interviewees’ views will be presented alongside a literature review on the same 
topic. 
 
3. Making sense of unburnable carbon – expert interviews and related literature 
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This section reports on 14 expert interviews with individuals who might be expected to 
have a view as to the plausibility of the unburnable carbon proposition. 12 of the interviews 
were conducted between February and April 2012 (when the unburnable carbon story was 
newly circulating in the media) with the other two being conducted in 2014 to gain insight on 
how experts were considering unburnable carbon at this later time. Individuals were located 
in Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States of America and included individuals 
who worked for carbon reporting institutions; financial accounting institutions; investors and 
their representative bodies; banks; fossil fuel companies and their industry associations; 
security regulators and academics. Ethical approval was obtained for this work and the usual 
protocols were followed to ensure informed consent was given, the right to withdraw from 
the work was guaranteed as was anonymity. The potential interviewee list and the questions 
to be asked were developed in consultation with the Carbon Tracker Initiative and was 
informed by their central role in this debate. A summary of interviewee characteristics is 
presented in Table 1. 
 
<Insert Table 1 about here> 
 
Some further observations about the interviews is necessary. A larger number of 
individuals (n=43) were approached for an interview by name (and not through a general 
contact to an institution). Some responded but declined to be interviewed with the reason 
that they viewed unburnable carbon to be a politically sensitive issue that they did not feel 
happy to engage with. The larger number of our potential interview list, however, never 
responded to our initial and follow up requests for a conversation. Moreover, a number of 
those who did consent to speak with us wished to stress they were speaking in their personal 
(rather than their professional) capacity. The majority of interviewees were reluctant for the 
conversations to be taped so notes were made after interviews. For four of the 14 interviews 
email correspondence was used to elicit answers to the questions. The interviews were semi-
structured around three broad themes: (i) how tight future carbon constraints are likely to 
be, (ii) the plausibility of the idea of unburnable carbon, and (iii) what implications would arise 
if there is unburnable carbon on stock exchanges. 
Our initial desire to construct a full interview series of some 30+ people to ‘test’ degrees 
of agreement/disagreement with the idea of unburnable carbon, therefore, was not possible. 
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It is almost certainly the case that the interviewees we spoke to are biased because they were 
individuals who were prepared to express a view on unburnable carbon. While they, in 
general, saw the rationale for there being unburnable carbon, they also sought to explain why 
they believe others might resist that notion. Given these constraints, we have used the 
interviews to structure themes around which explore the issue at hand. Specifically, an 
inductive thematic analysis of the 2012 interviews was undertaken (at that time little was 
known about how and when territorialization might take place: that is, when carbon 
constraints might be reflected in capital markets). Using these themes, a wider search for 
literature on the topics discussed was subsequently conducted in order to better understand 
the points being made and also to place these views in the context of insights that continue 
to emerge. This approach was also adopted to counter the paucity of interview data and to 
establish if there is wider support for their views. As a result, this section threads together 
interview responses with observations that can be found in the literature in order to develop 
a fuller narrative about the topics of interest. This is not the ‘usual’ function of an interview 
series in research. Rather, it is an approach that enables the insights offered by these experts 
to enhance our analysis of firm disclosure and inform our theoretical framework focused on 
Miller and Power (2013). 
Accurate determination of quantities of fossil fuel reserves and resources across the globe 
are not straightforward (see Grubert, 2012; Kjarstad & Johnsson, 2009; Owen, Oliver, 
Inderwildi & King, 2010) with the price of fossil fuels on global markets significantly affecting 
reported quantities of commercially recoverable reserves. Regardless, evidence exists that 
should we wish to combust fossil fuels (and are willing to pay to do so) there is no lack of 
underlying resource. What is also clear, is that measures “to comply with CO2 emission targets 
as recommended by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change will have a profound 
impact on future demand for oil" (Kjarstad & Johnsson, 2009, p. 445). 
McGlade & Ekins (2015) address this issue directly and provide a breakdown of 
unburnable carbon by fossil fuel type and region. First, McGlade & Ekins (2015, p. 187) 
reiterate that emissions “contained in present estimates of global fossil fuel reserves are 
around three times higher” than that which could be combusted if the 2oC target is adhered 
to and note that this would have “profound implications for the future utilization of oil, gas 
and coal” (McGlade & Ekins, 2015, p. 188). The article (using an assessment model – itself 
“subject to wide bands of uncertainty”, McGlade & Ekins, 2015, p. 188) estimates quantities 
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of known reserves that should not be combusted and suggests what the regional distribution 
of unburnable carbon might be (this will be further discussed later). While this work was 
published three years after the bulk of the interviews were conducted for this paper, 
interviewees demonstrate appreciation of these principles ahead of that empirical analysis. 
Interviewees all agreed that it is logical that climate change governance will create (at 
some point in the future) a limit on the amount of greenhouse gas that can be emitted and 
that this level is below current emissions. Further, interviewees believed that when a 
constraint crystalizes, the valuation of fossil fuel firms would be materially affected.4 The 
question raised by all interviewees, however, was “when will the regulatory environment 
move to the point of constraint?” (banker). One academic interviewee believed that: “it all 
rests on domestic and international regulation of carbon and the coming together … [of 
various elements] to form an international framework”. Another interviewee (stock 
exchange) suggested that by 2020 the UK’s carbon budgets might be sufficiently tight so as 
to alert capital markets to carbon constraints (another academic interviewee believed that by 
then international negotiations would have brought about a global governance regime). 
Taken as a whole, therefore, interviewees had a common belief that at some stage (most 
likely in the medium term) carbon constraints will become pressing which would ultimately 
have an impact on firm valuations and that these changes will have an effect on stock 
markets. In Miller & Power’s (2013) terms they could see a time when processes of 
territorialization and mediation would result in adjudication. The direction of such an effect, 
however, was not seen as being straightforwardly predictable. 
While one might expect an emission constraint to decrease firm value (due to an inability 
to utilize a resource under their control) interviewees expressed uncertainty about this 
expectation. One (academic) interviewee suggested that: “if climate policy puts in place 
restrictions … [on] the use of fossil fuels then valuations will plummet (with policy driving 
innovation around alternative sources of fuel in the short term). If restrictions are brought in 
over time and roughly match known reserves, then the fossil fuels (in particular oil) could be 
seen as a scarce resource … [increasing] the price of oil and … oil companies”. This view was 
also shared by another interviewee (investor) who believed that gas reserves would become 
more valuable in a carbon constrained world and hence (depending on type of fossil fuel held) 
                                                 
4 This accords with Griffin, Jaffe, Lont & Dominguez-Faus (2015, p. 2) who state that “unburnable fossil 
reserves places at risk some 40% to 60% of the market capitalization of the world’s top 200 energy companies”. 
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individual firm valuations might not fall even if overall fossil fuel sector values do reduce (see 
also Wolf, 2012). Before the event, what the process of adjudication would generate was, 
therefore, uncertain. 
These interviewee views reflect subsequent literature. For example, Van de Graff & 
Verbruggen (2015) also contest the assumption of a falling value of fossil fuels, noting that 
how climate policy is implemented (for example, through taxes versus efficiency standards 
and renewable subsidies) will have different price effects on fossil fuels. Another point was 
made by an analyst (quoted in Crooks, 2016) who “calculated that about 80 per cent of the 
market capitalisation of the large international oil companies reflects their proved reserves, 
which they expect to produce over the next 10 to 15 years” – well ahead of any hard 
constraint coming into play. 
Some interviewees had other grounds on which they argued against seeing a financial 
market effect of carbon constraints, namely: (i) the relative size of listed versus state owned 
fossil fuel companies may dampen out any stock market effect, and (ii) that technologies 
(such as carbon capture and storage) will mean that governance induced constraints might 
be delayed. Each of these issues with respect to how territorialization could be achieved is 
now explored in more depth. 
One interviewee (an investor) claimed that given listed companies hold only 5% of global 
reserves (with state owned companies holding the largest share) any misreporting of reserves 
for these firms might not have a material impact on stock markets (see Ritchie & Dowlatabadi, 
2015 and Mitchell & Mitchell, 2014). Kjarstad & Jonsson (2009) also noted the relatively larger 
size of national oil companies (as compared to those listed on stock exchanges and pointed 
out that while the six major oil companies owned 4% of global reserves in 2006 they 
accounted for 14% of global production (see also CDP, 2016, who track historical cumulative 
emissions and estimate that state owned fossil fuel firms account for 59% of cumulative 
emissions). Another (academic) interviewee agreed that the balance between listed and non-
listed firms was a valid consideration but noted that, if global carbon constraints are agreed, 
all firms (listed or otherwise) will be affected, and that this would affect the market for fossil 
fuels (with knock on effects on firm valuation and stock markets themselves). In this respect, 
the impact of a constraint would depend on the nature of a particular country, with some 
facing political unrest or economic turbulence as constraints bite (see Van der Ploeg, 2016, 
for a series of possible scenarios). As a result, political uncertainty might create risks for all 
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companies (some of which would be listed) operating in the country and these risks would be 
translated to stock markets substituting political risk for regulatory risk. 
The second area of debate reflected a belief that some form of new technological change 
(for example, carbon capture and storage) will ensure that business as usual will be possible. 
Again, interviewee views were supported by subsequent analysis. For example, McGlade & 
Ekins, 2015, p. 188, note that “the availability of carbon capture and storage has the largest 
effect on cumulative production levels” (while Van de Graaf & Verbruggen, 2015, p. 458 
describe carbon capture and storage as “fraught with huge uncertainty, technically, 
economically and politically”). This type of thinking is reflected in Griffin et al., (2015, p. 3) 
who suggested “while unburnable carbon may be a compelling story with worrisome 
implications for many, rational investors, would ‘see through’ the metaphor and analyze … 
strategic options”. While, technological innovation might mean that carbon constraints will 
not be faced as quickly as they may otherwise be, a precautionary approach would suggest 
that this is not a reason to ignore them. Moreover, Vergragt, Markusson & Karlssonm, (2011, 
p. 282) are representative of those who have concerns that while carbon capture and storage 
is a possible ‘bridge’ technology (that is, it might buy time for a low carbon transition) it might 
also lead to a “reinforced fossil fuel lock-in” which would not be helpful in the longer term. 
As is evident from the above discussion, uncertainty as to when and how any constraint 
might evidence itself exists. It would seem, however, from a review of the literature in this 
area (as well as the views of the majority of interviewees), that there is value in considering 
the likely impact of global governance driven constraints on the ability of fossil fuels to be 
combusted. Logically, any constraint will have a knock on effect on the valuation of fossil fuel 
firms and on stock markets more broadly. The impact of any constraint relies on the ability of 
the market to identify, understand and react to it. Whether or not the market is likely to do 
this, and what might need to change for this to be the case, was also discussed in the 
interviews. 
Interviewees suggested that stock market carbon literacy is essential for subjectivization 
(that is, to create a context where control can be achieved). There were also different views 
as to how carbon-literate stock markets are. One group (the smaller) suggested that if the risk 
of global climate change is significant, then the market would have already by definition 
factored it into their models and if they have not done so, then the information is irrelevant. 
Leaving aside the tautological nature of this argument, this view reflects a faith in the ability 
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of markets to be well enough informed on matters of global climate change to be able to 
evaluate and incorporate risks into firm valuation, as well as there being information that 
would allow this to happen (a point we examine in section four). The majority of the 
interviewees, however, did not share this view. Indeed, one stock exchange interviewee 
suggested that markets “will wake up, but will wake up late” and that the reason for this is 
that “physical factors are completely outside of analysts’ frames of reference … they don’t 
see the relevance of these factors and only see the relevance of market factors”. Regardless 
of carbon literacy, a clearer understanding of how valuations are made is also relevant, and 
here existing literature adds insight to interviewee propositions. 
Standard methods of valuation in the oil and gas sector rely on a combination of expected 
prices, costs and reserves volumes (Johnston & Johnston, 2006). Current reserve reporting 
provides estimates of these three items, either separately or in combination (that is, net 
present-value calculations). The calculation of volumes is well-defined and relatively precise, 
particularly in aggregate, where the law of large numbers takes effect. How these volumes 
are affected by prices and costs is more ambiguous and difficult to forecast. Medium to long-
term concern over carbon constraints might fit into specific investors’ (and non-investors’) 
valuations in different ways. For example, Cormier & Magnan (2002) note that a number of 
uncertainties affect fossil fuel valuations including the underlying volatility in resource prices 
(such as oil and gas). In addition, these authors note that there is "extensive discretion ... in 
the recognition and measurement of reported earnings" (Cormier & Magnan, 2002, p. 132) 
which further complicates firm valuation (see also Luther, 1996), with accounting choices in 
this area having well documented economic consequences (Cortese et al., 2009). 
Focusing specifically on reserves disclosure, Cormier & Magnan (2002) also explored how 
data on reserves discoveries, extensions and acquisitions affected firm valuations and found 
that this information possessed "incremental information content in explaining a firm's stock 
market value ... [and are] positively associated with a firm's stock price" (Cormier & Magnan, 
2002: 145 - a finding consistent with Spear, 1994, 1996 and Teall, 1992). What is less 
understood is the relative role of reserves data in valuations and the stability of this influence 
over time. Harris & Ohlson (1987) provide evidence that book-value is more value-relevant 
than the reported present-value of reserves under U.S. GAAP. They provide two possible 
explanations for this result. The first is that historical costs reflect what a firm has paid for its 
oil and gas properties and that effectively ‘you get what you paid for’. This implies a rational 
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explanation, whereby the historical costs of exploration, development and acquisition of 
reserves reflect a reasonable approximation of the market value of reserves. However, Harris 
& Ohlson (1987) also suggest that their results might imply a functional fixation with the 
accounting numbers and an inability of the market to incorporate other information into 
prices. This would imply that until carbon constraints are directly reflected in transactions and 
costs (a process of territorializing), they will not be reflected in stock prices.  
This is not to say that information about carbon constraints has never translated to stock 
prices. In a test of the impact of the Nature papers discussed in the introduction, Griffin et al., 
(2015) found a small negative stock price drop (for a sample of the 63 largest U.S. oil and gas 
firms) subsequent to media coverage of these articles suggesting, in their analysis, “results 
consistent with the rational response hypothesis, namely, that despite the relative obscurity 
of the Nature article, stock prices declines by 1.5% to 2.0% … over days -1 to 1 around the … 
publication date” (p. 9). Later (in 2012/13) more press stories emerged on the idea of 
unburnable carbon but these had no statistically significant impact. These authors also note 
the general tension our interview series exposed: that “evidence does not support the 
predictions of many that recognition of unburnable carbon might prompt a substantial 
reduction in the shareholder value of fossil fuel firms” (Griffin et al., 2015, p. 9) while also 
noting that they could not “rule out the possibility of a carbon bubble … as market prices in 
the past have grossly deviated from the underlying fundamentals” (Griffin et al., 2015, p. 10). 
Another reason for a lack of effect may be that investors do not know which carbon will 
become unburnable. This suggestion finds some support in, for example, Busch & Hoffmann 
(2007, p. 522) who identify an event where a potential future global climate change related 
cost was reflected in the capital market. Busch & Hoffmann (2007) noted that “Xstrata, a FTSE 
100 listed company that exports coal to Japan … [shares] fell approximately 10% in just a few 
days” after an announcement by the Japanese Government that it was considering a coal levy. 
It might be that in this case the effect was observed because of the ability to link a restriction 
to a particular firm and fossil fuel type in a specific location. Indeed, they suggest that 
individual firm effects of a general constraint will depend on “a wide range of different factors 
such as emission-intensity, energy source mix, geographical location of production facilities, 
marginal abatement costs and technology trajectory” (Busch & Hoffmann, 2007, p. 524). This 
strongly suggests that information disclosure will need to be sufficiently detailed to enable 
nuanced modeling of firm specific effects. Indeed, McGlade & Ekins’ (2015, page 189) 
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estimation of unburnable carbon (by location and fossil fuel type) yields large ranges of 
estimates. For example, in the USA they estimate 6% of oil; 4% of gas and 92% of coal is 
unburnable while in Canada the figures are 74% of oil; 24% of gas and 75% of coal. Obviously, 
these differences will generate unequal exposure to unburnable carbon and would require 
more detailed corporate disclosure than is currently provided. 
A combination of evidence drawn from expert interviewees and the literature, therefore, 
suggests that global climate change governance will create constraints that will be value 
relevant and potentially material. It also seems to be the case that markets are able to 
respond to climate change governance impacts and hence could be assumed to react (if it 
was necessary) to re-value fossil fuel stocks. Interviewees were aware of the complexity of 
developing a coherent approach to ensuring that any carbon constraints (and their timing) 
are properly determined and expressed in ways that would allow market participants to 
translate this information into firm specific risk assessments and valuation decisions and from 
there to achieve adjudication and subjectivization. Complexity in this area arises from the 
inherent uncertainty in the phenomena being considered (that is, the existence and impact 
of constraints) as well as the difficulties associated with providing disclosure in this area. For 
example, one interviewee (banker) suggested that the provision of information from a trusted 
source on country level risk exposure as well as sector associations making information 
available on risks by fossil fuel type would be helpful (echoing data that has subsequently 
been developed by McGlade & Ekins, 2015). The interviewee noted that self-interest might 
make the provision of this information unlikely, but that it would be a precursor to 
understanding any data that might be provided by individual firms. Likewise, the willingness 
of firms to disclose data that might highlight risks was questioned; it is in this area that the 
issue of regulation of data was raised. 
One interviewee (carbon reporting body) noted that disclosure of greenhouse gas 
emissions had developed quickly with the establishment of the CDP and the Climate 
Disclosure Standards Board and that these bodies might facilitate the process of determining 
what ‘good’ quality disclosure in this area would look like (see, for example, CDP, 2016). 
Likewise, movements in the development of integrated reporting were viewed by one 
investor as being synergistic with reporting needs in this area. Indeed, one investor 
interviewee noted that Chairmen (sic) were starting to consider the strategic impact of the 
global climate change agenda and this might eventually translate into disclosure (but that 
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presently it had not done so, due to perceived investor indifference). Other interviewees 
appeared more interested in mandatory disclosure, with stock exchange listing requirements 
being identified as a mechanism for disclosure. Indeed, one investor described stock 
exchange listing bodies as being the “gatekeepers to international sources of finance” and 
suggested that if they required information then it would be provided. While this might be 
the case, stock exchange listing bodies might not be willing to increase data requirements in 
response to every issue that stakeholders think is desirable (and, indeed, existing disclosure 
requirements might be sufficient for these purposes – see section four). 
In summary, interviews with market participants alongside a review of the relevant 
literature suggests that the principle of unburnable carbon is conceptually sound. What is less 
accepted is when carbon might become unburnable and the impact of this on company 
valuation. These are matters that one might expect companies themselves are thinking about 
– even if they are not discussing the matter in the public domain. There is a need, however, 
to check if there are any relevant disclosures about unburnable carbon in accounts as well as 
to consider if there is adequate disclosure requirements to support disclosure. It is to these 
two questions that our analysis now turns: these are also central questions if the 
territorializing effect of accounting and reporting are to emerge. 
 
4. Disclosure survey: requirements and sample disclosures 
 
In this section we present an over-view of the predominant disclosure requirements for 
fossil fuel reserves and resources that companies must follow if they want to be listed on a 
stock exchange. We then undertake a company-specific survey of disclosures within seven 
countries that have substantial listings of companies involved in fossil fuel exploration, 
development and production, seeking evidence about the incidence of disclosures that could 
be linked to unburnable carbon. The disclosure survey undertaken encompasses two time-
periods (2011 and 2014). The earlier time-period was selected as it was immediately after the 
Carbon Tracker Initiative (2011) publication that sought to make the argument that capital 
markets should consider unburnable carbon. The countries and companies for the 2011 
survey were also selected after consultation with the Carbon Tracker Initiative. This initial 
analysis identified little disclosure, so a second round of analysis was undertaken in 2014, to 
see if there had been movement during the intervening years. The countries surveyed were: 
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Australia, Canada, China, Russia, South Africa, the United Kingdom and the United States of 
America. The media surveyed for this study includes conventional financial reports, alongside 
disclosures made to the CDP and any standalone reports. Taken together, this sampling 
strategy is aimed at uncovering any ‘leading edge’ reporting (more detail of the disclosure 
capture protocols are contained in section 4.2). 
 
4.1 Classification, evaluation and reporting of Reserves and Resources 
 
Reporting by mineral and oil and gas companies is regulated by a complex of standards 
emanating from a number of sources (see also Linnenluecke, Birt, Lyon & Sidhu, 2015). The 
determination of the physical quantity of reserves and resources requires three steps: 
evaluation, classification and disclosure. There are a number of published evaluation and 
classification systems to support reserves and resource determination (see Camisani-
Calzolari, 2004, for a brief history). These do not have regulatory force in and of themselves. 
Rather, their use is required by other regulatory organisations (for example, the European 
Securities and Markets Authority or the United States Securities Exchange Commission, 
hereinafter SEC). The common classification system for minerals is the Committee for Mineral 
Reserves International Reporting Standards (CRIRSCO, 2013) template. The CRIRSCO 
template is the set of standard definitions and principles that are incorporated in the family 
of standards developed under the auspices of the International Council for Mining and 
Metals, a CEO-led industry group. For oil and gas evaluation and classification, the Petroleum 
Resource Management System (PRMS) is commonly used, developed by the Society of 
Petroleum Engineers (2007). In addition to these internationally agreed standards, most 
countries also specify their own standards for classification and evaluation. All these systems, 
however, are mapped to the PRMS and CRIRSCO templates (with the main differences 
between the national and other standards arising in the evaluation methods dictated and the 
types of disclosures allowed or required). The systems in place for the seven countries 
surveyed are outlined in Appendix 1. 
Figure 1 outlines the classification system used by PRMS. Production refers to the sum of 
all volumes produced to date, beyond this category all figures are estimates. The general term 
‘reserves’ typically refers to oil and gas and mineral resources that are commercially viable 
and are further broken down into the sub-categories of proved (P1), probable (P2) and 
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possible (P3). Contingent resources are those discovered, but not commercially viable 
because of any one of a number of contingencies and reflect the same profile of probabilities 
that reserves and prospective resources do in Figure 1. For conventional oil and gas, the main 
issue in the past regarding classification was whether the oil could be discovered and if, once 
discovered, it was technologically feasible to extract the resource. In contrast, unconventional 
resources have generally been discovered for some time and it was a matter of determining 
how to extract them (for example, by fracking). It is within these rules that any unburnable 
carbon could be recognized. Environmental and social considerations are specifically 
addressed in determining the commercial viability of a reserve under the PRMS. If reserves 
were deemed to be subject to a combustion constraint, they should be re-classified as 
contingent resources (that is, contingent on their ability to be utilized).  
 
<Insert Figure 1 about here> 
 
The PRMS classification system in Figure 1 is not to scale; if it was, the unrecoverable volumes 
would be much larger. Most resources will never be produced within any foreseeable future, 
regardless of any carbon constraints. In this paper, questions around unburnable carbon 
relate primarily to reserves and these are only a small portion of the oil and gas resources we 
know about, let alone of the oil and gas that exists somewhere in the lithosphere.  
Moving to mining, the CRIRSCO template has analogues to the PRMS system. The CRIRSCO 
template includes social and environmental aspects in its ‘Modifying Factors’, where 
consideration of mining, metallurgical, economic, marketing, legal, environmental, social and 
governmental factors are what determine if a measured or inferred resource can be classified 
as a reserve (our emphasis). The various country specific codes that map to the CRIRSCO 
template also contain similar language. For example, the Australian JORC (2004), includes 
other information that should be considered and disclosed as part of the evaluation process, 
namely: “[t]he effect, if any, of natural risk, infrastructure, environmental, legal, marketing, 
social or governmental factors on the likely viability of a project” (JORC, 2004, p. 18). How 
one might evaluate if these modifying factors are present rests on the skill and competencies 
of those making these classifications and it is here that these technical standards have 
parallels to the accounting profession. 
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Each of the classification and evaluation systems considers the competency of the 
individual (defined as a ‘competent person’ under PRMS and CRIRSCO) tasked with the 
preparation of the reserves and/or resource reports (with some differences between the 
codes, such as whether or not the evaluator must be a third party). Camisani-Calzolari (2004, 
p. 204) emphasizes that the competent person “is a fundamental concept in these codes”. Of 
specific interest for our purposes is the extent to which environmental matters are relevant 
to the work of evaluators. CRIRSCO’s reporting template notes that “[c]ompetent persons 
must discharge their duties with fidelity to the public…[and in] particular…recognise at all 
times that the responsibility of competent persons towards the public overrides all other 
specific responsibilities including responsibility to professional, sectional, or private interests” 
(p. 35). Further, they state “[i]n performing their work, competent persons should strive to 
protect the natural environment” (p. 36). Competent persons are also required to “[e]nsure 
that mineral reserve estimates acknowledge the likely environmental impact of development 
and ensure that appropriate allowances are made for mitigation and remediation” (p. 36). As 
a result, there are two layers of requirements for environmental matters to be addressed in 
the classification process. First, all companies falling under a reporting code are required to 
consider environmental factors in their justification of whether or not reserves can be 
extracted. Second, the competent person is reminded that considering environmental factors 
is part of their professional duty to the public. 
Along with being subject to the professional skills and integrity of the competent person, 
evaluations are also subject to corporate governance oversight. Many firms have reserve 
committees that oversee resource reporting. Any of the senior management sign-offs, such 
as those required under the U.S. Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002), also require assurance that the 
evaluator has followed due diligence. Taken together, therefore, several opportunities for 
unburnable carbon reserves to be identified in technical determinations of the quantity and 
classification of reserves exists as well as within internal due diligence reviews. Moreover, 
accounting standards also have something to say regarding appropriate disclosure. 
The accounting standards at play for fossil fuel companies are mostly either U.S. GAAP or 
IFRS (Schneider, Michelon & Maier, 2017; Schneider, 2011). An oft-held misconception is that 
accounting standards dictate reserves and resources reporting rules; as is apparent from the 
preceding description of the technical standards in play, this is not the case. Under IFRS there 
are no requirements for the reporting of reserves and resources.  Under US GAAP it is only oil 
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and gas firms that must disclose reserves information. Although accounting standards are 
largely silent on reporting reserves, they are considered a key estimate and are typically 
discussed in the notes to the accounts of both IFRS and US reporters. Regardless of any direct 
reserve reporting, reserve and resource classification and evaluation play a direct role in 
financial accounting issues for oil and gas and mineral firms via items such as impairment, 
depletion, environmental provisions (or asset retirement obligations under US GAAP) and 
business combinations. If a firm’s reserves are re-classified as contingent resources, due to 
anything from a drop in the market price for fossil fuels or a carbon constraint, firms could 
face write-downs of their oil and gas and/or mining assets (that is, those figures on the 
balance sheet that reflect prior expenditure to identify reserves). 
The various exchanges on which mineral and oil and gas firms are listed also have specific 
requirements on what reserves and resources must and may be disclosed. The most 
restrictive of these requirements are those of the SEC. US listed oil and gas firms must report 
Proved Reserves and may report other Reserves, while mining firms must report Proved plus 
Probable Reserves. No other disclosures are allowed. Thus, if a Reserve is re-classified as a 
Contingent Resource, US listed firms can no longer report them. In the other jurisdictions, 
resources other than reserves may be disclosed. For example, in Canada, National Instrument 
(NI) 51-101 (Canadian Securities Administrators, last amended 2015) dictates that proved plus 
probable reserves must be disclosed and other disclosure is optional (that is, possible 
reserves, contingent resources and prospective resources). For US reporters, future carbon 
constraints could move reserves off the annual reserve reports; while non-US issuers would 
see their reserves move to the contingent resource classification for oil and gas. Both of these 
have significant implications with regard to capital markets reporting. 
Finally, a common element of reserves and resource disclosure in oil and gas is a 
discounted cash-flow valuation of the reported reserves. In the US, the Modernization of Oil 
and Gas Reporting (SEC, 2009) and US GAAP (FASB, 2010: Accounting Standards Codification 
932 Extractive Activities – Oil and Gas) dictate a standardized measure of discounted cash-
flows (often referred to as SMOG): a 10 percent discount rate and a price based on the 
average of previous 12 months. Meanwhile, in Canada, NI 51-101 allows for a present value 
(PV) disclosure based on a number of discount rates and forecast prices (the other 
jurisdictions also allow disclosure based on or similar to NI 51-101). Again, the key disclosure 
is the classification, with the move between reserve and contingent resource being the key 
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issue. If a resource is classified as a reserve, this implies it will provide a positive cash-flow 
and hence burnability. If it becomes a contingent resource, it falls out of any present value 
calculations. 
In addition to the sector-specific reporting requirements discussed above, oil, gas and 
mining companies are expected to comply with more general reporting obligations (that also 
increasingly emphasize climate matters). For example, the US SEC issued interpretive 
Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related to Climate Change (2010) and it “emphasizes that 
disclosure of material climate change issues is a matter of pre-existing legal obligation, as it 
has long been a requirement that companies disclose material risks to investors” (Coburn, 
Donahue & Jayanti, 2011, p.9, our emphasis). Further, the Canadian Securities Administrators 
Staff Notice 51-333 Environmental Reporting Guidance (2010) “requires the issuer to describe 
any implemented environmental policies that are fundamental to its operations and the steps 
it has taken to implement them” (Canadian Securities Administrators, 2010, p. 16). 
In summary, this outline of disclosure requirements makes several things evident. First, 
there is an existing set of disclosure requirements that govern fossil fuel companies’ 
disclosures and these come from a variety of sources, only some of which are accounting 
orientated. Second, these disclosure requirements all have environmental parameters as part 
of their evaluations and provide scope for disclosures concerning the non-combustibility of 
reserves to be recognized5. Third, the professionals who are charged with responsibility for 
bringing this data to the public domain have environmental related duties placed on them. 
As a result, if carbon constraints become a contingent factor in the ability of resources to be 
considered commercially viable, current classification and evaluation systems dictate that this 
should be considered. Given this, we now explore if any disclosures of this sort have been 
made in recent years in our analysis for firm reporting. 
 
4.2 Disclosure analysis 
 
                                                 
5 The Financial Stability Board’s Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures (2017) focuses attention 
on disclosing the financial implications of climate related information, in a decision-useful, consistent, 
comparable, context-specific way. It acknowledges existing legal obligations in developed economies to 
disclose material climate-related risks in financial statements but it also identifies “the absence of a standardized 
framework for disclosing climate-related financial risks” which impedes investor understanding. 
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The initial cross-country sample was created in consultation with the Carbon Tracker 
Initiative, in a first phase of research based on disclosures in 2011: namely five of the largest 
listed companies with substantial fossil fuel holdings, from each of the seven countries with 
substantive fossel fuel listings.  Documents from these 35 companies were collected for the 
years 2011 and 2014. Of the 35 companies, 19 were for mining, 15 were oil and/or gas and 
one was a combined oil, gas and coal company. In 2014, two UK companies were not in the 
sample due to takeovers and a South African firm had been privatized. These firms are not 
included in the overall 2011 versus 2014 analysis reported subsequently. All available annual 
reports, forms 10-K (and forms 20-F or 40-F for foreign firms listed in the United States), 
integrated reports, sustainability reports, and the CDP questionnaire responses (if they were 
in the public domain: 18 of 35 companies responded to the questionnaires in both 2011 and 
2014) were included in the review. For one Australian company, the 2014 sustainability report 
is available online only. As our analysis required a stand-alone document, we dropped their 
2011 and 2014 sustainability reports from the quantitative analysis. Appendix 2 presents the 
companies, by country, reviewed for this study. By taking an array of reports, and a careful 
selection of countries, we identified those firms who were most likely to disclose unburnable 
carbon, if it exists.  
All documents were uploaded to the qualitative software program NVivo. Relevant 
passages were searched for and categorized into one of six categories. These were: (i) ‘boiler 
plate’ disclosure about risks that global climate change (and governance related to it) raises 
for the company; (ii) reference to greenhouse gas emissions; (iii) specific reference to 
‘stranded assets’; (iv) disclosures that relate to constraints on combusting carbon, (v) 
reference to a low carbon economy and (vi) reference to natural gas as a low carbon fuel. The 
search for these phrases was based on related key words (as well as their acronyms and 
variations): climate change (and risk), greenhouse gas, stranded assets, carbon constraints, 
low carbon economy, and natural gas (in the context of lower downstream emissions). The 
surrounding paragraphs were reviewed to assess the global climate change content in the 
reports. The detailed review was undertaken by one of the lead researchers, with an extensive 
background in the oil and gas and mining industries. Regular feedback between all 
researchers provided ongoing direction on the document review process. The review was 
methodical, with new variations of any of the key words added to the search (for example, 
low carbon economy also includes low emissions economy). It is possible (even probable) that 
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the review missed certain mentions of pertinent words and phrases in forms other than those 
specified in the search but the process of reviewing surrounding paragraphs for relevant 
disclosures would have mitigated this risk. All reviews covered the companies’ general climate 
change disclosures across all documents. Any variant not captured in the text search would 
need to be in unrelated sections of these documents, rather than a main message to 
shareholders and other key stakeholders. Although very time consuming, replication is not 
technically difficult, but we contend that any “counter-examples” would not affect the overall 
discussion and conclusions presented herein. 
To give a general sense of things, Table 2 summarizes disclosures based on climate 
change and greenhouse gas disclosures by company, by year and by media (categories (i) and 
(ii) from above). In broad terms, there is a rising incidence of disclosure on risk and on 
greenhouse gas disclosures between the sample years and across all document-types. The 
incidence of disclosure does vary by country, however, with China in particular and Russia to 
an extent having relatively lower levels of disclosure.   
 
<Insert Table 2 about here> 
 
The highest frequency of disclosure is found in CDP returns. This is as expected given the 
particular focus of the disclosure regime, but it also suggests that this investor-focused 
medium might be where we first see unburnable carbon disclosures in the future. Moreover, 
the strength of this media is that it prescribes a set of questions to which they are seeking a 
response (compared to ‘CSR’ reporting where the scope of disclosures are at the preparers’ 
discretion). If the CDP was concerned about unburnable carbon, they might be the first to call 
for disclosure (we revisit this proposition in the penultimate section). While there is no inter-
temporal change related to the number of firms completing the CDP questionnaire (18 of the 
firms responding in both years), Table 2 shows increases in the frequency of disclosures in the 
CDP. Exploring these specific CDP disclosures shows that the increase in disclosure is likely to 
have been driven by the expansion of the CDP questionnaire.  
The main objective of the review was to examine the disclosures themselves, and it is here 
that more nuance regarding company understandings of the potential for unburnable carbon 
is evident. Returning to category (iii) from above, disclosures of stranded assets, BHP Billiton 
and Wesfarmers (both Australian companies) use this phrase in their 2014 annual reports but 
 24 
not in 2011. BHP’s disclosure is the most forthright, starting with a sub-heading of “Stranded 
assets and the ‘carbon bubble’”, then stating: 
 
The potential gap between the current valuation of fossil fuel reserves on the balance 
sheets of companies and in global equities markets and the reduced value that could 
result if a significant proportion of reserves were rendered incapable of extraction in 
an economically viable fashion due to responses to climate change, is known as the 
‘carbon bubble’. Although this concept has been discussed by non-government 
organisations and academics for several years, there has recently been renewed 
interest in this topic, particularly from ratings agencies and investment analysts. There 
is, however, little consensus on what specific carbon prices, fossil fuel demand or 
market prices might trigger this devaluation6. Providing access to the affordable 
energy required to continue economic growth is essential for maintaining living 
standards and alleviating poverty. Under all current plausible scenarios, fossil fuels 
will continue to be a significant part of the energy mix for decades.” BHP Billiton 2014 
Annual Report, p. 51, (similar disclosures also found in its 20-F and Sustainability 
Report). 
 
Given that BHP Billiton is not solely an oil and gas or coal company (neither is Wesfarmers), 
they may feel more comfortable commenting on unburnable carbon. At the same time, their 
disclosure is typical of much found in the study, offering a role for fossil fuels as underwriting 
living standards (with a link to alleviating poverty) and faith in a continued role of fossil fuels 
in general.  
A total of five firms mention stranded assets (or related) in any of their reporting. Of 
these firms, it is only BHP Billiton and Wesfarmers who mention it in their annual reports. If 
management deems information to be material to investors, it must be disclosed in the 
annual report. Thus, by definition, all other sample firms consider the concept of stranded 
assets to be immaterial to their investors. The other firms that do mention stranded assets 
are in the ‘big oil’ club: BP, ExxonMobil and Shell, which emerges in 2014 in their sustainability 
                                                 
6 While this firm was not an interviewee (see section 3) their disclosure reflects interviewee views from the 
earlier time period. 
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reporting, and seems a direct response to public pressure on the issue. ExxonMobil’s mention 
of stranded assets can be found in its 2014 Corporate Citizenship Report: 
 
“ExxonMobil believes producing our existing hydrocarbon reserves is essential to 
meeting growing global energy demand. We enable consumers — especially those in 
the least-developed and most-vulnerable economies — to pursue higher living 
standards and greater economic opportunity. We believe all economic energy sources 
will be necessary to meet growing demand, and the transition of the energy system 
to lower carbon sources will take many decades due to its enormous scale, capital 
intensity and complexity. As such, we believe that none of our proven hydrocarbon 
reserves are, or will become, stranded.” ExxonMobil 2014 Corporate Citizenship 
Report, p. 37. 
 
As before, there is an allusion to fossil fuels (and by extension the activities of the company) 
as being beneficial, especially to the developing world. What is more nuanced about this 
disclosure is that it refers to proved reserves only. 
BP also provides assurance to its stakeholders on the value of its proved reserves via 
its 2014 sustainability report: 
 
“Valuations are based on proved reserves, which are not ‘stranded assets’. 
The value of the upstream part of BP’s business is mainly based on proved reserves, 
and less so estimates of probable or possible reserves. BP’s proved reserves are 
produced, and historically replaced, over a 13-year timeframe on average. On this 
wavelength we can adapt our investment strategy to changes in policy, market or 
technology conditions.” BP Sustainability Report 2014, p. 16 (emphasis in original). 
 
As Figure 1 sought to demonstrate, proved reserves are only a sub-set of reserves and 
resources. On the surface these two statements imply that there is no question of stranded 
assets, yet technically they are focused only on a narrow definition of resources (a fact that 
might not be immediately apparent to a casual reader – a point also made by Ritchie & 
Dowlatabadi, 2015, p.68). Although outside of the securities reporting channels, disclosures 
such as this (and lack of disclosure to the securities authorities) imply strongly that there is 
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no movement to suggest to shareholders that their investment as at risk. We note here that 
at the time of writing, the Attorneys General of several US states have ascertained that there 
is inadequate disclosure in this area, with several ongoing lawsuits.7 These investigations 
cover disclosures over the recent years and are likely to cover the 2014 year. Beyond this 
paper, our international cross-section may provide a baseline from which to continue 
research into how firms react to legal challenges of inadequate disclosure of material items 
(i.e. how do they defend themselves based on their baseline disclosures and what subsequent 
disclosures have they made in response?).  
Considering our full cross-section of companies, with such a small number of direct 
references in mandatory or voluntary reports to stranded assets, we conclude that the issue 
of unburnable carbon is not currently considered a material item.  Regardless, climate change 
risk is subject to more disclosure and this material has also been analysed for salience with 
respect to the issues addressed in this paper. In particular, several themes emerge from our 
analysis, including: (a) the presence in many disclosures of normative statements about the 
role of carbon-based fuels in the future energy mix – particularly in the sense of fossil fuels 
being key to economic growth and improving the lives of those in the developing world; (b)  
the prevalence of what we might call ‘boiler plate’ disclosures8 where companies indicate that 
they are alert to future risks from domestic and international global climate change 
regulation, but that how this might crystalize is sufficiently uncertain that they cannot disclose 
anything material presently; and (c) a belief (not entirely unwarranted) that technological 
innovation will allow continued use of fossil fuels (for example, carbon capture and storage) 
and/or a change to the company portfolio to a heavier weighting on natural gas (as a lower 
carbon fuel) or renewables. In all of these instances the time frame over which change is 
assumed to happen is the longer term and disclosures suggest that it will be managed as it 
arises and/or is sufficiently uncertain that no current action is possible. These sentiments 
were also evident in the interviews of the previous section. 
                                                 
7 For example, see an article in the Toronto Globe and Mail, October 26th, 2018 on a lawsuit by the Attorney 
General of New York against ExxonMobil for inadequate risk disclosure and under-estimation of future carbon 
costs in Alberta’s oil sands: Alberta oil-sands companies likely to face lawsuits similar to Exxon: expert. 
Available at: https://www.theglobeandmail.com/business/article-alberta-oil-sands-companies-likely-to-face-
lawsuits-similar-to-exxon/.  
 
8 Abdo, Mangena, Needham & Hunt (2018) also noted a tendency towards ‘tick box’ reporting in the context of 
demommissioning costs in annual reports of oil and gas companies. 
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We now move to the remaining three categories described at the opening of this sub-
section; categories (iv) carbon constraints, (v) low carbon economy and (vi) natural gas as a 
low carbon downstream fuel. It is here that we again find some echoes of the interview 
themes outlined in the previous section. Specifically, there is open acceptance in disclosures 
that change is going to come, but also that it is not happening yet. Conversely, a number of 
firms emphasise natural gas as a key part of the move to a low carbon economy. The firms 
who make these disclosures all have large natural gas reserves, with the implication that these 
reserves are even more valuable in a low-carbon economy. Gazprom is a clear example of a 
firm touting natural gas as a low carbon fuel. Gazprom owns 72% of Russian reserves9 and it 
states in its 2014 annual report (referencing improved gas pipeline infrastructure):  
 
“The project directly beneﬁts the economic potential of virtually every Russian region 
and is raising the standard of living for millions of citizens. Moreover, expanding the 
gas supply system allows of using natural gas as the most sophisticated and clean 
alternative to other fuels.” OAO Gazprom 2014 Annual Report, p. 68. 
 
As a further analysis, all previously categorized mentions of natural gas were then sub-
categorized into whether natural gas was described as an opportunity for the firm, or if any 
transition to natural gas as a lower carbon fuel was a threat to the firm. In 2011 we find 66 
and in 2014 we find 65 mentions of natural gas as a low carbon fuel. All but five of these were 
in a positive context. Of the positive mentions, 73 percent are attributable to Gazprom 
(Russia), Sasol (South Africa), BP (UK) and Shell (UK), all of whom have substantial natural gas 
reserves.   
The five negative context disclosures for natural gas are uniquely referencing the US coal 
industry. The disclosure by Arch Coal (US) effectively captures the sentiment: 
 
“Additionally, coal competes with other fuels, such as natural gas, nuclear energy, 
hydropower, wind, solar and petroleum, for steam and electrical power generation. 
Costs and other factors relating to these alternative fuels, such as safety and 
                                                 
9 OAO Gazprom 2014 Annual Report, p. 10. 
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environmental considerations, affect the overall demand for coal as a fuel.” Arch Coal 
2014 10-K, p. 21. 
 
Arguably, natural gas is a threat to coal regardless of the climate change debate. However, 
having noted the prevalence of ‘boiler plate’ disclosures regarding climate change, there are 
examples of disclosure in the US coal industry that point towards what might be expected in 
the context of unburnable carbon (as we have seen from McGlade & Ekins, 2015, coal is likely 
to be more unburnable than other fossil fuels). For example, Peabody Coal (US) noted: 
 
“Concerns about the environmental impacts of coal combustion, including perceived 
[our emphasis] impacts on global climate issues, are resulting in increased regulation 
of coal combustion in many jurisdictions, unfavorable lending policies by 
government-backed lending institutions and development banks toward the financing 
of new overseas coal-fueled power plants and divestment efforts affecting the 
investment community, which could significantly affect demand for our products or 
our securities.” Peabody Energy Corporation, 2014 10-K, p. 28. 
 
In closing, Kjarstad & Jonsson (2009) observed that, if governance reflects emission 
reductions that accord with scientific opinion, there will be a profound impact on oil prices. 
The same holds for other classes of fossil fuels with the impact of price changes being 
translated through to individual firm valuations mediated by and reflected in stock exchanges 
where fossil fuel companies are listed. Some time ago, Busch & Hoffmann (2007, p.  518), 
after reviewing “the literature regarding the financial consequences of carbon constraints on 
the macroeconomic, sector and company level”, found a lack of clear indication of likely 
capital market responses to date (p. 523, quoting Garz & Volk, 2003, see also Griffin et al., 
2015). This literature suggests “most companies view climate change as a slow-burning 
economic risk that will happen in time frames well in excess of their investment horizons” 
(Leurig, 2011, p. 17). The disclosures presented here accord with this view and highlight the 
uncertainly about the extent of unburnable carbon while recognizing that there is evidence 
in some disclosures that this issue is understood. As certainty starts to emerge, the key 
question concerns what will trigger the existing disclosure rules to enable Miller & Power’s 
(2013) playing out of the process of territorializing, mediating, adjudicating and subjectivizing. 
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5. Discussion and synthesis of the empirical work 
 
Taking evidence from the literature review, interviews with market commentators and 
participants, a review of the reporting requirements for fossil fuel companies, as well as a 
review of disclosure practices (over time, across countries and in all corporate disclosure 
settings), we conclude that there is a relative absence of disclosures on unburnable carbon, 
despite there being a plausible case to answer with respect to combustibility. Why this might 
be the case requires further exploration with four themes being developed in this section. 
Theme one evaluates the robustness of existing mechanisms that would result in unburnable 
carbon disclosures. The second theme revisits the issue of whether it is possible to know 
specifically which carbon will be unburnable and to link that data to an economic entity. 
Theme three considers what we might learn from existing accounting controversies and how 
new accounting rules have crystalized in the past. The final, and fourth, theme proposes other 
sources of reporting norms that may provide information on unburnable carbon ahead of any 
accounting disclosure being triggered. All of these themes provide the basis for a synthesis in 
section 6 of the case examined here using the Miller & Power (2013) framework. 
 
5.1 Mechanisms for disclosure 
 
A review of various disclosure requirements within financial reporting and stock exchange 
listing suggest that there is sufficient existing guidance that would lead to unburnable carbon 
being identified and disclosed should it be believed to exist. For example, PRMS requires 
assessment of what reserves are “commercially recoverable … under defined conditions” and 
the Pan-European Reserves and Resources Reporting Committee’s (2017) exhortation that 
disclosures enable users to estimate what reserves have “reasonable prospects for eventual 
extraction”. Non-combustibility of reserves due to climate change governance fit within this 
guidance. Additionally, guidance about the professional duties of those certifying reserve 
quantities (for example, CRIRSCO’s reporting template at p. 35/36) state that competent 
persons have an overriding duty to the public and that protecting the natural environment 
falls within this remit. The SEC guidance on oil and gas, and minerals, would also provide 
support for disclosures. There is, therefore, sufficient guidance on and specification of 
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calculations that should be made and information that should be provided if fossil fuel 
reserves become unburnable. Of course, this is not a guarantee that disclosures will be made 
and is behind the recommendations of the Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures 
(FSB, 2017) who seek to “help organizations meet existing disclosure obligations more 
effectively” (p. 17). 
Central to disclosure processes are the competent persons, “professionals who take full 
responsibility for their submissions” (Camisani-Calzolari, 2004, p. 297). There is no suggestion 
that this group of professionals are not doing their job correctly, however, it would help 
accounting disclosure considerations if more were known about this profession and how it 
functions (and whether or not, for example, they have considered unburnable carbon). From 
the brief description offered by Camisani-Calzolari (2004), competent persons appear to have 
the ‘usual’ paraphernalia of professionals such as technical knowledge, training, certification 
and relevant experience (see also Njowa, Clay & Musingwini, 2014). We have not, however, 
been able to find any literature to draw from to better understand this profession, nor 
evidence on how accountants interact with them and their evaluations (we included 
extensive keyword searches of the American Institute of Professional Geologists website as 
well as specialist journals such as the Journal of Professions and Organization on these 
matters). This point of intersection, however, is likely to be critical to any process of 
translating competent persons assessments into corporate reporting (see Ascui & Lovell, 
2012, for an equivalent discussion of the groups involved in carbon accounting 
auditing/assurance). 
We, therefore, conclude that the mechanisms for identifying unburnable carbon (if it 
exists) are present in the existing regulatory environment and that there is no need to develop 
new guidance. What this finding suggests, however, is that there may be a problem 
translating the existing guidance into disclosure because exactly which carbon is unburnable 
is not clearly identified. 
 
5.2 Identifying unburnable carbon 
 
McGlade & Ekins’ (2015) analysis demonstrates that unburnable carbon varies by 
geographic location and fossil fuel type. The question then arises of whether it would be 
possible to translate this data to the scale of an individual economic entity (this is a perennial 
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problem for environmental accounting – see Bebbington & Larrinaga, 2014, and Milne & Gray, 
2013). Data on reserves by fossil fuel type in a country are found in some (but not all) country 
national accounts and are perceived to be of variable quality. Likewise, entity level disclosures 
of fossil fuels held by location are disclosed under some (but not all) corporate reporting 
regulations. In order to translate data from these sources a nesting of information from the 
international, region, country and firm level could be developed if international agencies, 
governments, stock markets and individual investors were to be informed about carbon 
constraints (this would have the additional benefit of identifying if any specific stock 
exchanges are differentially exposed to risk). Assembling together these data would be a non-
trivial task and it may be that until this could be done, it is impossible to estimate unburnable 
carbon at the individual company level. 
Moreover, it is also possible that climate change governance processes might specify 
which reserves are to stay in the lithosphere. For example, re-conceptualizing a fossil fuel 
reserve as a ‘right’ to pollute might generate a different reading of the value of a reserve. Not 
surprisingly, the classification systems are designed to identify resources and reserves that 
are valuable for as long as there is an economic use of the fossil fuels. If however, the asset is 
conceptualized as a pollution right that will expire at a certain time in the future (for example, 
when a carbon budget is ‘spent’) then how its value is assessed is likely to be different and 
may accord more closely to changes in carbon governance processes. 
While it might be useful to contemplate these issues, presently there is no international 
governance process that would identify which particular reserves can be combusted. In a 
generic sense, however, it is possible to specify the data requirements for disclosure, 
including the domains where uncertainty would have to be resolved. Specifically, before 
reporting could be expected, uncertainty would have to be resolved for: (i) base physical data 
on reserves and resources; (ii) timing and nature of likely future global climate change 
governance related restrictions on combustion; (iii) the potential to offset emissions by way 
of technology developments (for example, carbon capture and storage); (iv) changing 
demand for classes of fossil fuels dictated by the approach used to transition to a low carbon 
economy (for example, transportation policy); (v) a sense of the location of reserves held by 
listed companies versus state owned companies and the effect of any differential impact on 
combustibility that this might bring; and (vi) the timing of the development and adoption of 
substitute technologies that might reduce the need for fossil fuel combustion. This list is 
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daunting and underlines the point that (in all probability) we are in a pre-reporting phase for 
robust entity level estimates of unburnable carbon. The next theme considers when a 
crystallization point in that process could be expected. 
 
5.3 Changing accounting practices 
 
At critical junctures in the past, accounting has had to deal with significant changes in 
economic circumstances that required new accounting measurements and disclosures, the 
inflation accounting debate being a case in point. At the same time, there are many other 
occasions where accounting rules have had to adjust to more routine changes in 
circumstances (for example, the accounting treatment of oil and gas expenditures - see 
Cortese et al., 2009 – which has generated controversy). As such, some literature suggests 
that accounting responds to changing economic circumstances after there has been some 
crisis (Canning & O’Dwyer, 2013; Waymire & Basu, 2011; Zeff, 2003)10. Taking this point 
seriously, it could be anticipated that the substantive application of existing reporting 
guidance (as would be the case in unburnable carbon) and/or the development of new 
measurement and disclosure rules requires some sort of political, economic or ethical crisis. 
What would precipitate a crisis in the context of unburnable carbon is unclear (but the legal 
cases currently being launched might be a possible trigger). The economic damage that would 
arise for companies, stock markets and economies if large percentages of value were lost 
from fossil fuel stocks would be calamitous. As a result, this theme explores how a smooth(er) 
transition to the application of existing accounting rules that recognize a new (carbon) reality 
might be achieved. 
Camisani-Calzolari (2004) identifies three audiences for disclosures on fossil fuel (and 
other commodity) reserves, namely: international agencies, governments and investors/stock 
markets. Of particular interest in the context of this theme is the governmental level of 
resolution where codes focus on the “necessity of each state to exploit its mineral potential 
profitably and to secure the preservation of wealth for future generations” (p. 297). Prior 
failures to adequately account for reserves (for example, the Poseidon nickel boom in 
Australia, the Bre-X fictitious Busang gold deposit in Indonesia and the South African case of 
                                                 
10 Discussions with senior academic researchers who examine the evolution of accounting standard setting 
reinforced this suggestion that change is often preceded by a crisis. 
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Noble Minerals – see Camisani-Calzolari, 2004, p. 301-302 for more detail and Fox, 2017) 
resulted in losses for the companies in question but also for national economies. In this 
respect there may be a strong alignment of state and market interests in accurately 
identifying unburnable carbon, albeit that it is unclear when and how such alignment would 
come to pass. 
Further, and critically, global climate change responsiveness and the emergence of a 
carbon constraint will involve the same governments who are seeking to utilize fossil fuel 
reserves and resources. Jakob & Hilaire (2015, p. 151) note the: 
 
“distributional challenge of climate policy: imposing a limitation on the use of fossil 
fuels transfers economic benefits (known as rents) from resource owners to those 
who obtain the right to use the remaining burnable reserves. Hence, successful 
climate policy will crucially hinge on the question of whether this ‘climate rent’ can be 
shared in an equitable way that also ensures resource owners are compensated for 
these losses”. 
 
It seems, therefore, that disclosures may co-evolve with climate change governance and that 
understanding the distributional aspects of (for example) carbon budgets might have 
important implications for understanding the presence of unburnable carbon (see also Jaffe, 
2016 and Van de Graaf & Verbruggen, 2015, who note provisions in international climate 
change protocols to support energy exporting states’ transition away from fossil fuels). 
 
5.4 Parallel reporting processes 
 
This fourth theme moves away from existing disclosure requirements to consider if there 
could be a non-accounting related source of unburnable carbon information. Two possible 
sources for the generation of data on reserves are national governments and private 
regulatory actors, each of which will be considered below.  
Camisani-Calzolari (2004, p. 297) notes that reserves reporting codes have enabled the 
“spread of information across political boundaries” and highlights uranium resource 
classification (linked to the development of nuclear energy and weapons) as an example of 
international collaboration. In this case, accurate records of uranium reserves as well as the 
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demand for them were required to allow technological development in energy markets to 
emerge. Given the criticality of atmospheric emissions concentrations, and the presence of 
national level inventories for emissions, it would be possible (with some work) to join data 
from the likes of McGlade & Ekins (2015) and data provided to the UNFCCC, to sketch which 
carbon is going to be unburnable (deciding which it would be is a complex political process as 
noted above). At the same time, if corporate level data were to match reserves to location 
and by fossil fuel type you would have the start of a mechanism to mediate between reporting 
and financial markets. It may be that such a process would not proceed swiftly enough to 
inform investors. As Van de Ploeg (2016, p. 216) suggests the “market may simply not realize 
that the slow policy ramp for pricing carbon on which the world seems to be, due to all kinds 
of national and international political obstacles, is irrational … [and once] the correction 
comes, and most likely much sooner than market expect, the price of carbon will be volatile”.  
Leaving aside inter-governmental action, it is possible that private governance initiatives 
might move to offer information for markets about unburnable carbon, as has been the case 
in emissions reporting. Indeed, unburnable carbon might build on the World Business Council 
for Sustainable Development & World Resources Institute (2004)  protocol. For example, this 
protocol distinguishes emissions by ‘scope’. Existing scopes are: scope 1 (emissions from 
sources owned or operated by the reporting entity, for example, emissions from owned gas 
powered boilers); scope 2 (emissions associated with the generation of energy purchased by 
the reporting entity, for example, purchased grid electricity); and scope 3 (other emissions 
that arise as a result of the activities of the reporting entity – such as supply chain emissions). 
None of these scopes account for future emissions11. It could be argued that fossil fuels 
reserves and resources are an example of what could be described as ‘scope 4’ emissions. In 
particular, the review of reserves and resources reporting standards in section 4.1 suggests 
that the composition and likely extraction ratios of fossil fuels reserves are known and it 
would be possible to convert these data into likely future emissions, should the reserve be 
combusted. If this calculation were undertaken, then the carbon-yet-to-be burned could be 
estimated. If that were the case, investors and other users of information could make their 
                                                 
11 Carbon Tracker and the UN’s Principles of Responsible Investment (2017) publication 2 degrees of 
separation: transition risk for oil and gas in a low carbon world uses International Energy Agency data to 
analyse potential carbon budgets associated with limiting global warming to 2 degrees and their distribution 
across global oil and gas entities. 
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own judgements regarding risks associated with unburnable carbon in the context of known 
carbon budgets12. 
This section, taken as a whole, has sought to discuss the implications arising from the 
empirical analysis in sections three and four. We would argue that it is a matter of when and 
not if a carbon constraint comes into being that will prompt further consideration of 
unburnable carbon. How quickly that constraint emerges and how governments, 
accountants, other professional groups, companies and stock markets approach this issue will 
be critical in terms of limiting investor losses and economic shocks. Our work has raised two 
issues that bear further investigation. The first concerns the nature of inter-professional 
engagement over reserves estimates, which might lead to better data to support investor 
decision-making. Second, possibilities for developing accounts of future carbon emissions 
linked to reserves warrants further exploration and may link to other propositions, such as 
being able to estimate the ‘financed emissions’ in loan books (another contested setting). 
With those specific observations made, the paper now broadens its scope to use this case to 
explore the functionality of accounting representations as they come into contact with 
alternative representations of value and explicitly reconnects this to the four functions of 
accounting explored by Miller & Power (2013). 
 
6. Concluding comments 
 
This paper sheds light on the constitutive effects of accounting through an extended study 
of the proposition that there is unburnable carbon on stock exchanges. Central to this paper 
is a belief that here is a mismatch between the value that investors ascribe to future fossil 
fuel reserves and resources and an ecological reading of the future (informed by science and 
policy). This mismatch is important if we accept that “accounting defines as well as mediates 
interests” (Willmott et al., 1992, p. 33). Our working hypothesis was that the science view of 
combustibility of fossil fuels is the ‘better’ value judgement and there is evidence from the 
literature, some disclosures and interviews that if the science view is sustained, fossil fuel 
                                                 
12 The fossil fuel industry would not be the only setting where this data could be useful. For example, it may be 
that those who are in charge of transport infrastructure such as air and seaports, pipelines, railways and roads 
might also usefully estimate this sort of information insofar as infrastructure implies the locking in of certain 
emissions profiles (see also Scholtens, 2017 and World Resources Institute and the United Nations 
Environment Programme Finance Initiative Portfolio Carbon Initiative, 2015). 
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company values will be reduced. The relative lack of disclosure and non-recognition of 
unburnable carbon by stock markets, therefore, required an explanation. 
In the context of fossil fuel reserves and resources reporting, well-established practices of 
translation exist that enable geologically informed representations of quantities and qualities 
of reserves and resources to have value relevance for firms, with such data being found in 
financial reporting artefacts (annual reports). It would appear that the “procedures of 
measurement, classification and recording that can be applied to a domain of activities” 
(Robson, 1991, p. 551) have been satisfied in this case. Emerging from the global climate 
change governance process, however, are contradictory judgements regarding the value of 
reserves and resources. That is, it has been recognized in both policy and economic literatures 
(as well as by our study participants) that some fossil fuels will not be combusted given the 
demands for climate stability. Given the centrality of accounting technology (which we regard 
to include information reporting in annual reports that have value relevance), Miller & 
Power’s (2013) typology of accounting’s functionality provides a way of explaining why 
unburnable carbon is currently not recognized in company reporting. 
The first function Miller & Power (2013) identify is that accounting creates (and recreates) 
calculative spaces for organizational and societal actors to interact (territorializing). In the 
context of climate change governance, a desire to limit greenhouse gas emissions is translated 
into a physical quantity of emissions that can be emitted (the carbon budget) without 
breaching what science (as modified by the political process) determines is appropriate in 
order to avoid dangerous climate change. At the same time, another calculative practice (that 
of fossil fuel reserves and resource reporting) creates a measure of the value of fossil fuels 
without (currently) strong reference to the climate change informed set of calculations. This 
is not to say that translation, in a technical sense, is impossible between these different 
calculations. Indeed, McGlade & Ekins (2015) achieve this by translating fossil fuel reserves 
into emissions along with estimations of the proportion that are unburnable on a regional 
basis. This suggests that territorialisation is at least partially possible. Further, these 
calculations create, in principle, a space where interactions might occur and where the 
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difference in societal and capital market views of the value of fossil fuel reserves could be 
discussed (mediation) 13. 
Moving to Miller & Power’s (2013) second function (mediation), some complications can 
be observed. Mediation implies that actors can interact with each other because 
territorialisation has taken place. The actors that we might identify in this context are those 
dealing with stock market valuations and those considering carbon constraints. There are 
some communicative domains where these groups interact, with the CDP and standalone 
reports providing potential points of connection. Given neither of these reporting formats are 
yet fully engaged with unburnable carbon, possibilities for mediation on that specific aspect 
is possible in theory but not yet achieved in practice. It is also the case that fossil fuel reserves 
and resources reporting itself takes place within a corporate reporting mechanism (the 
Annual Reports and Accounts) that is less amenable to the inclusion of environmental 
considerations, and as such while a company may produce accounts that could be seen to 
create an economic-environmental hybrid (the standalone report) these are not fully 
integrated within the firm itself. Moreover, the notion of a carbon budget (which would bring 
unburnable carbon more clearly into the frame) is not one that is used within any of the 
reporting media examined, whose focus is historical (rather than prospective as would be 
encapsulated in the idea of scope-4 emissions). 
Third, and moving to adjudication, several points can be made. First, we have suggested 
above that both territorializing and mediating functions are only partially achieved in the case 
presented and this, in a general sense, makes evaluation of activities of organizations’ 
performance in the context of unburnable carbon difficult to achieve. At the same time, and 
critically, our interviews suggested that while market participants acknowledged the salience 
of the idea of unburnable carbon, they were unable to identify what particular carbon might 
be left unburnt. This is due to an underlying lack of certainty of when and how any carbon 
constraint would arise as well as a lack of knowledge of possible technological innovations 
(such as carbon capture and storage) that may alter current beliefs as to what carbon is non-
combustible. The impossibility of linking McGlade & Ekin’s (2015) data to particular corporate 
contexts (that is, a less than full territorializing) means that adjudication is also impaired. 
                                                 
13 Carbon Tracker Initiative and Principles for Responsible Investment (2017) allocate carbon budgets under a 2 
degree scenario to largest 69 publicly traded oil and gas companies but a lack of observable response to this 
work suggests that territorialization has not yet occurred. 
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Having noted that, a less than full adjudication does not mean that there is none taking place 
at all. In particular, there is evidence of fossil fuel divestment prompted by concerns about 
carbon constraints. This implies that over time we may see this element of Miller & Power’s 
(2013) framework strengthen – especially if territorializing and mediating functions also 
become more robust. 
Fourth, and finally, control (subjectivizing) has not yet been observed in the case of 
unburnable carbon and fossil fuel reserves and resources reporting (at least in part due to the 
flow through nature of weaknesses in the preceding elements: territorializing, mediating and 
adjudicating). In addition, there are different degrees of legitimacy (and hence narrative 
power) associated with the positions held by market participants versus climate change 
governance actors with corporate narratives of value being more powerful presently. At the 
same time, there are hints that corporate power can respond to development-orientated 
concerns when a link is made in disclosures from fossil fuels to developing world well-being. 
Ultimately, establishing control over global climate change futures by way of identifying 
which carbon can be burned (implied in a carbon budget) is the key to recognition in the 
reports on reserves and resources held by fossil fuel companies. 
To close, we argue that the case of unburnable carbon illuminates the processes by which 
accounting gains salience as well as the “spatially and historically varying calculative practices 
… that allow accountants and others to describe and act on entities, processes and persons” 
(Chapman et al., 2009, p. 1). Indeed, our work demonstrates that reporting of fossil fuel 
reserves and resources (as a part of the broader accounting assemblage) is “engaged in a dual 
hybridisation process, seeking to make visible and calculable the hybrids that it encounters, 
while at the same time hybridising itself through encounters with a range of other disciplines” 
(Miller, Kurunmäki & O’Leary, 2008, p. 942). The Miller and Power (2013) characterisation of 
the various ways in which accounting functions has enabled us to address the aim of this 
paper: to explain why contrasting accounts of the value of fossil fuel reserves co-exist. The 
framework, however, also enabled us to suggest how this situation could change and that 
processes would be required in order for the value ascribed to fossil fuels to be established 
in a way that reflects both economic and ecological rationales. In a modest way, this paper 
also provides an insight into the value of the Miller & Power (2013) framework for 
understanding accounting. In that respect, their typology was helpful to deconstruct a 
contemporary setting where accounting and reporting practices have yet to emerge. 
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Appendix 1: Selected Resource Evaluation, Classification and Disclosure codes and 
regulations (for countries subject to analysis) 
 
Country Minerals  Oil and Gas 
International Committee for Mineral Reserves 
international Reporting Standards 
(CRIRSCO) - International reporting 
template (2013). 
 
United Nations Framework Classification 
for Resources 2009 (see United Nations 
Economic Commission for Europe, 2015). 
 Petroleum Resource Management 
System (PRMS).  
 
 
 
United Nations Framework 
Classification for Resources (2009). 
Australia ASX Listing Rules Chapter 5:  
Additional Reporting on Mining and Oil 
and Gas Production and Exploration 
Activities. 
 
Evaluation and Classification is based on 
the Australasian Code for Reporting of 
Exploration Results, Mineral Resources 
and Ore Reserves (Joint Ore Reserves 
Committee, hereafter JORC, 2004), one of 
the CRIRSCO family of codes. 
 ASX Listing Rules Chapter 5:  
Additional Reporting on Mining and 
Oil and Gas Production and 
Exploration Activities 
 
ASX Listing Rules Guidance Note 32: 
Reporting on Oil and Gas Activities 
 
Proved plus Probable Reserves must 
be disclosed; all other Resources may 
be disclosed. 
 
Classification and evaluation must be 
based on PRMS. 
Canada Canadian Securities Administrators 
National Instrument 43-101: Standards of 
Disclosure for Mineral Projects.  
 
Evaluation and Classification is based on 
the Canadian Institute of Mining: 
Definition Standards on Mineral 
Resources and Mineral Reserves (CIM, 
2005), one of the CRIRSCO family of codes 
and standards. 
 
 Canadian Securities Administrators 
National Instrument 51-101: 
Standards of Disclosure for Oil and 
Gas Projects. 
 
Proved plus Probable Reserves must 
be disclosed; all other resource 
classifications may be disclosed. 
 
Evaluation and Classification is based 
on the Canadian Oil and Gas 
Evaluation Handbook (COGEH). 
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Country Minerals  Oil and Gas 
China China has its own national system. 
Securities regulations differ by exchange.  
 
Hong Kong dictates JORC, NI 43-101, 
SAMREC, or other code acceptable to the 
Exchange. 
 China has its own national system. 
Securities regulations differ by 
exchange. 
 
Hong Kong dictates PRMS, or other 
code acceptable to the Exchange (i.e. 
COGEH). 
Russia The (Russian) National Association for 
Mineral Resources (NAEN, 2011) 
 
Part of the CRIRSCO family of codes and 
standards. 
 Oil and Fuel Gas Reserves and 
Resources Classification of the 
Russian Federation of 2013 
 
South Africa The South African Code for the Reporting 
of Exploration Results, Mineral Resources 
and Mineral Reserves (SAMREC, 2007). 
 
Part of the CRIRSCO family of codes and 
standards. 
 The South African Code for the 
Reporting of Oil and Gas Resources 
(SAMOG) 2015 Edition, as amended 
1st February 2015. 
 
The South Africa Regulator has 
developed a working relationship 
with the Alberta Securities 
Commission and models its 
regulation directly after the Canadian 
regulation NI 51-101 (required 
disclosure of P1+P2 reserves, P3 and 
resources optional).  
UK* 
 
Commission Regulation (EC) 809/2004, as 
updated 20 March 2013. 
 
Classification and evaluation is allowed 
based on any of the CRIRSCO family of 
codes and standards. 
 Commission Regulation (EC) 
809/2004, as updated 20 March 
2013. 
 
Classification and evaluation is 
allowed based on PRMS, COGEH or 
the Norwegian Petroleum 
Directorate. 
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Country Minerals  Oil and Gas 
USA 
 
SEC Industry Guide 7 (1981) 
 
Only proved plus probable reserves are 
allowed to be disclosed. The classification 
and evaluation methods are given in the 
guide, but are fairly vague and no national 
guidelines are cited. 
 
 
  
 Modernization of Oil and Gas 
Reporting 2008. This provides 
revisions to Regulations S-K and S-X, 
allowing for the first time, the 
reporting of Probable Reserves.  
 
Proved Reserves must be reported, 
Probable Reserves may be reported, 
no other Reserves or Resources may 
be reported in required filings. 
 
Accounting Standards CodificationTM 
Topic 932 - Extractive Activities 
requires note disclosure of Proven 
Reserves.  
Notes:  
* There is also a specific ‘Note for Mining and oil and gas companies’ for listing on the 
Alternative Investment Market (AIM) which was issued in June 2009. 
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Appendix 2: List of companies reviewed 
 
Russia  Canada South Africa China 
Severstal JSC 
Mechel OAO 
Rosneft Oil Co. 
Lukoil Holdings 
Gazprom OAO* 
Teck Resources Ltd* 
TransAlta Corp* 
Canadian Natural 
Resources Ltd* 
Suncor Energy Inc* 
Husky Energy Inc* 
Exxaro Resources 
Ltd* 
Sasol Ltd* 
African Rainbow 
Minerals Ltd* 
Optimum Coal 
Holdings Ltd** 
Wescoal Holdings Ltd 
Shanxi Coking Co Ltd 
Inner Mongolia Yitai 
Coal Co. Ltd 
China Shenhua 
Energy Co. Ltd 
SINOPEC Ltd 
CNOOC Ltd 
USA UK Australia  
Peabody Energy 
Corp 
Alpha Natural 
Resources Ltd 
Arch Coal Inc 
Exxon Mobil Corp* 
Chevron Corp* 
Eurasian Natural** 
Resources Corp plc 
Xstrata plc** 
Anglo American plc* 
BP plc* 
Royal Dutch Shell plc* 
Rio Tinto* 
BHP Billiton* 
Wesfarmers Ltd* 
Oil Search Ltd 
Woodside Petroleum 
Ltd* 
 
*Responds to 2011 and 2014 CDP Questionnaires 
** Taken over or privatized between 2011 and 2014 
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Figure 1 – The Petroleum Resource Management System 
(Society of Petroleum Engineers, 2007) 
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Table 1: Interviewee summary 
 
Interviewee background/expertise Details (number interviewed; year of interview; 
location of interviewees and geographic 
location*) 
Academics Two interviewees; conducted in 2012; UK based 
Banks Two interviewees; conducted in 2012; mainland 
Europe based 
Carbon reporting institutions One interviewee; conducted in 2012; UK based  
Financial accounting institutions One interviewee; conducted in 2012; UK based  
Government agencies One interviewee; conducted in 2014, Canada based 
Investors and representative bodies Five interviewees; conducted in 2012; UK and 
USA based 
Securities regulators/stock exchange Two Interviewees; conducted in 2012 and 2014; 
Canada and UK based/ 
* While these interviewees were based in a particular location, all of them had an 
international focus on the issues at stake and several of their organisations had an 
international remit. 
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Table 2: Disclosure summary (for all companies summed by country) 
Location Type of disclosure 2011 2014 
Australia disclosures 
Annual Report Risk Narrative 16 38 
 GHG Disclosure 38 65 
    
Form 20F Risk Narrative 9 37 
 GHG Disclosure 8 23 
    
CSR report Risk Narrative 33 39 
 GHG Disclosure 66 60 
    
CDP Risk Narrative 76 143 
 GHG Disclosure 68 119 
Canada Disclosures    
Annual Report Risk Narrative 11 13 
 GHG Disclosure 27 25 
    
AIF (Reserves) Risk Narrative 14 31 
 GHG Disclosure 30 52 
    
CSR report Risk Narrative 31 25 
 GHG Disclosure 102 111 
    
CDP Risk Narrative 104 283 
 GHG Disclosure 164 253 
China disclosures 
Annual Report Risk Narrative 1 2 
 GHG Disclosure 0 0 
    
Form 20F (two firms) Risk Narrative 2 1 
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 GHG Disclosure 1 1 
    
CSR report Risk Narrative 6 8 
 GHG Disclosure 3 5 
    
CDP Risk Narrative 0 0 
 GHG Disclosure 0 0 
Russia disclosures 
Annual Report Risk Narrative 12 12 
 GHG Disclosure 27 18 
    
CSR report Risk Narrative 24 22 
 GHG Disclosure 37 46 
    
CDP Risk Narrative 19 27 
 GHG Disclosure 22 24 
South Africa disclosures (N.B. Integrated reports are mandated, which include the annual 
report) 
Integrated Report Risk Narrative 32 24 
 GHG Disclosure 32 35 
    
Form 20F (one firm) Risk Narrative 9 3 
 GHG Disclosure 8 4 
    
CSR report Risk Narrative 32 43 
 GHG Disclosure 38 35 
    
CDP Risk Narrative 91 169 
 GHG Disclosure 59 106 
UK disclosures 
Annual Report Risk Narrative 27 32 
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 GHG Disclosure 30 40 
    
CSR report Risk Narrative 59 56 
 GHG Disclosure 54 69 
    
CDP Risk Narrative 81 141 
 GHG Disclosure 107 128 
USA disclosures 
Form 10-K Risk Narrative 21 19 
 GHG Disclosure 33 30 
    
CSR report Risk Narrative 3 37 
 GHG Disclosure 33 61 
    
CDP (two firms) Risk Narrative 52 68 
 GHG Disclosure 101 157 
 
 
